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Abstract— The botnet is considered as a critical issue of the 
Internet due to its fast growing mechanism and affect. 
Recently, Botnets have utilized the DNS and query DNS server 
just like any legitimate hosts. In this case, it is difficult to 
distinguish between the legitimate DNS traffic and illegitimate 
DNS traffic. It is important to build a suitable solution for 
botnet detection in the DNS traffic and consequently protect 
the network from the malicious Botnets activities. In this 
paper, a simple mechanism is proposed to monitors the DNS 
traffic and detects the abnormal DNS traffic issued by the 
botnet based on the fact that botnets appear as a group of hosts 
periodically. The proposed mechanism is also able to classify 
the DNS traffic requested by group of hosts (group behavior) 
and single hosts (individual behavior), consequently detect the 
abnormal domain name issued by the malicious Botnets. 
Finally, the experimental results proved that the proposed 
mechanism is robust and able to classify DNS traffic, and 
efficiently detects the botnet activity with average detection 
rate of 89%. 
Keywords-Botnet detection, Network threat detection, 
Network worm detection. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The growth in the area of network in the past few years is 
considered as a part of the exponential growth of the 
communication system. The network is just like computers; 
it needs software to simplify its functionality and makes it 
easy to use. Internet browsing, e-mail, and instant messaging 
are a few examples of the usage of computer communication 
over the Internet. Nowadays, personal computer systems are 
widely used, hence the number of Internet subscribers have 
increased gradually. Generally, these computers contain 
important data, such as users’ information and probably any 
business activities [9].  Therefore, the computers have 
become a favorite target that attracts the attacker s’ 
community. Even though, these systems are protected by 
antivirus software and firewalls, they may still be exposed to 
different malicious attacks. Especially, those attackers are 
always looking for various techniques to assist them in 
compromising a large number of computer systems in the 
world [2]. 
Nowadays, Botnet is considered as a serious problem as 
it forms a major and dangerous part of the Internet. This is 
because it spreads rapidly in the network over the Internet, 
and it is difficult to be detected because they have the ability 
to hide themselves as the virus and propagate as the network 
worms [9, 21]. 
II. BOTNET PHENOMENON 
Botnet consists of a collection of Bots running on a 
compromised computer, which can be remotely controlled 
by an attacker called “botmaster” via the command-and-
control (C&C) server. Importantly, these Bots are individual 
piece of programmable software. It can be installed and run 
automatically in any compromised system, and it has the 
ability to spread similar to the worms’, and also it can evade 
any detection programs similar to viruses [26]. So any 
compromised network infected with a large number of Bots, 
is called a botnet [1]. 
 
All Bots receive and execute the same command from 
the botmaster and respond to the same C&C server for an 
execution result [5]. The Botnet listens to a particular 
channel (i.e. IRC and HTTP) in C&C server [14] to receive 
further instructions from the botmaster [7]. These channels 
are used to carry out commands issued by the botmaster to 
the Bots [18]. In most cases, the C&C server is a 
compromised system under the control of the botmaster who 
is controlling the entire Botnet. The Bots need to 
communicate with the C&C server regularly to receive more 
instructions from the botmaster [5]. Therefore, if the network 
administrators or authorities block the C&C server, the Bots 
cannot receive the commands issued by the botmaster. In this 
case, the botmaster will compromise a new C&C server and 
use the Dynamic Domain Name System (DDNS) to move 
his domain name from the old C&C server to the new C&C 
server [18]  
 
The DNS is a distributed database spread over the 
Internet, which is used to translate the domain names into IP 
addresses and vice versa [14,23]. Thus, by using the DNS, 
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“botmaster” could direct the Bots to migrate to the domain 
name, which has been moved to new C&C server as the 
domain name is hard-coded in the Bots’ binary. The botnet 
queries the DNS server to find out the “botmaster’s” domain 
name. In return, the DNS server replies to the Bots and 
provides them with the new IP address of the “botmaster’s” 
domain name, which is located in a new compromised C&C 
server [18]. Nowadays, the DNS has become the desired 
target of “botmasters” due to its importance in the Internet. 
DNS is not owned or controlled by a specific organization 
and the DNS traffic flows between the clients and DNS 
server without any protection or restriction. As such, the 
Botnet can exploit the DNS to perform their malicious 
activities. The Botnet queries the DNS server just like any 
legitimate host and the DNS server responds to this query 
without distinguishing the source of the query [3].  
 
III. BOTNET AND DNS 
 
There are many computer applications and 
legitimate users who utilize the DNS to access the Internet 
and perform their jobs correctly [24]. On the other hand, 
Botnet also utilizes the DNS to perform its malicious 
activities. Since many normal applications require DNS to 
access the Internet, the problem persists in how the normal 
DNS traffic caused by a legitimate user or application can 
be distinguished from the abnormal DNS traffic caused by 
the Botnet activity. However, by monitoring the DNS 
traffic, it is possible to identify and detect the Botnet in the 
DNS traffic [11,24].  
 
IV. BOTNET BEHAVIOR 
 
Akiyama et al. (2007) proposed three important 
behaviors of botnet, which was discovered by monitoring the 
activities of Botnets during the flow of data in the C&C 
servers [1]. These behaviors are: 
 
• Bots Relationship:  The relationship 
between botmaster and Bots is one to many, because 
the botmaster usually controls a number of Bots and 
issues the same command to all the Bots. Hence, the 
Bots work as one group and it is possible to detect 
their behavior by monitoring the activities of these 
groups of Botnet in the network traffic. 
 
• Bots Synchronization: Botnet receives the same 
command from the botmaster. They communicate 
between each other and attack at the same time. This 
action can expose the group of Botnet, because the 
ratio of traffic that is released from this group is very 
high compared to the others and in some cases these 
traffic are discrete in time. 
 
• Bots Responding: When the Bot receives 
commands from the botmaster, it responds 
immediately to those commands and executes them 
accurately. When the Bot receives a command from 
the botmaster, it executes it immediately without a 
need to think about it, so the time taken to do this is 
always constant. Thus, this response time can be 
used to discover the presence of the Botnet.  
                
Monitoring the botnet behaviors and exploit it, is 
considered as one of the detection keys of the Botnet 
activities in DNS traffic. Choi et al. (2007) discussed some 
Botnet features in the DNS, and how the Botnet could 
exploit the DDNS to move to new C&C server when the old 
one is blocked. If so, the Botnet queries the DNS server to 
find the location of the domain name [4]. Table 1 shows the 
comparison between the activities of a legitimate host and 
Botnet when both are using the DNS.  
 
TABLE I.  DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BOTNET AND LEGITIMATE HOSTS  
Using DNS By Requested Domain Name 
Activity and  
Appeared 
Pattern 
Botnet  
Botnet 
members have 
fixed group size 
Group 
appears 
immediately  
Legitimate Host 
Anonymous 
legitimate users 
have random size 
Usually 
appears 
randomly and 
continuously 
 
V. DNS MONITORING 
 
There are several researches conducted with regards to 
this problem, these researches focused on distinguishing 
between the normal DNS traffic generated legally in the 
monitored network, and those suspicious and alike to Botnet 
behavior.  
 
Kristoff, (2004) conducted a study that monitors the 
DNS, in order to detect the botnet with prior knowledge of 
the blacklisted servers that spread or connect to malicious 
malware. This approach can simply evade when the 
botmaster knows this mechanism, hence it could be easily 
tricked by using fake DNS queries [11]. Therefore, Weimer, 
(2005) conducted another study to monitor the DNS traffic. 
The study was in passive DNS replication. The purpose of it 
was to build a reverse lookup with IP addresses for which no 
PTR records exist. By doing so, it will be easy to detect any 
domain name used to contact a system on the Internet [23]. 
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Dagon (2005) discovered that the ratio of abnormal DNS 
traffic is high compared to the others and this indicates the 
presence of botnet activity. But this approach generates false 
results and could classify the legitimate domain name as 
abnormal domain name [6].  
 
Ramachandran et al.’s (2006) proposed a technique and 
heuristics by utilizing the DNSBL blacklist lookup traffic to 
identify the botnet, where the technique performs counter-
intelligence that detects DNSBL inspection on the botnet 
activity group that spreads the mail spam. But this technique 
also generates false positives due to the active nature of 
counter-measures such as inspection poisoning. Besides, this 
approach could not detect the distributed inspection [16]. As 
a result, Schonewille and Van Helmond (2006) proposed an 
approach based on the abnormal frequency of NXDOMAIN 
reply rates. However, the approach could detect several 
abnormal domain names effectively and generate less false 
positives [20]. Choi et al.’s (2007) study detects the botnet 
by exploiting the group activity feature of the botnet. This 
approach is stronger than the previous approaches but the 
main weakness of this approach is when it is applied to large 
scale network as the processing time will be higher [4]. 
Finally Tu et al. (2007) conducted a study to identify the 
activities of botnets by mining the DNS traffic data [22]. 
 
Meanwhile, the proposed approach in this paper does not 
require any prior knowledge of blacklisted servers to classify 
the DNS. Besides, it also does not depend on the high ratio 
of DNS traffic to detect the botnet. However, it depends on 
exploitation of the Botnet’s behavior in the DNS traffic, 
particularly the appearance of botnet as a periodic group of 
hosts. The probability of botnet detection can be obtained by 
measuring the ratio of similarities between any blocks of the 
hosts that requested the same domain name at any given time 
interval.  
 
VI. THE PROPOSED METHOD 
 
The proposed mechanism refers to monitoring and 
capturing the DNS traffic at different time intervals t , and 
measure the ratio of similarity between any two blocks of 
hosts X and Y (group behavior) requesting the same domain 
name at time intervals t  and t . Therefore, the Jaccard 
similarity coefficient S  is chosen because it is simple and 
provides good results [4, 17].  Jaccard similarity coefficients 
consist of three summation variables: X, Y and Z as shown in 
Equation 1: 
 
                      S  =     (1) 
 
Z is the number of similar elements that are in both two 
objects X and Y.  
X is the number of elements in the first object X only but 
not in Y. 
Y is the number of elements in the second object Y only 
but not in X. 
 
Table 2 clarifies the probability value of the Jaccard 
similarity coefficient S when used to match between two 
blocks of hosts.  
 
TABLE II.  JACCARD SIMILARITY VALUES  
Jaccard 
Similarity 
Value 
Probability 
S = 1 Similarity ratio between all the hosts in 
the two blocks is 100%. So this domain 
name is an abnormal domain name issued 
by Botnet activity. 
S  ≥ 0.8 
 And 
S  ≤ 1 
There is an assurance that 80% of the 
hosts make association in a direct or 
indirect relation. It is a good value for this 
research (considering false alarm rates 
and network delay time). Hence, this 
domain name is an abnormal domain 
name issued by Botnet activity. 
S  ≥ 0  
And  
S < 0.8 
The similarity ratio is less than 80% as it 
cannot be stated exactly that there is a 
similarity between the two blocks of 
hosts. So this domain can classify as 
normal domain name. 
S  = 0 There is no similarity between hosts in 
the two blocks and consequently the 
domain name is normal domain name. 
 
To apply the Jaccard similarity values between the two 
blocks of hosts, the MAC address is a preferred choice as the 
host’s identifier rather than the IP address. This is because 
the botmaster exploits the feature of dynamic IP that may 
hide the identity of the infected hosts with the Bot. 
Consequently; it is not reliable to place this IP on the 
blacklist. The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) 
assigns multiple dynamic IP addresses to the unique host. 
Any infected host such as laptops can move from one 
network to another with new IP address assigned to it each 
time it connects to a new network. This forms the host’s 
identifier by tracing the IP address aliasing and generating 
false information about the activity of this host [25]. 
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By using the MAC as host’s identifier to identify the 
activity of the hosts, accurate results could be obtained even 
if the hosts move from one location to another, because the 
DHCP cannot act on the MAC address. Moreover, the 
infected hosts that caused this abnormal traffic can be 
detected. However, the MAC address spoofing is not taken 
into consideration, because any Bot infected host would want 
the reply back to itself when sending a query to the DNS 
server. In the case of spoofing, the reply is sent back to 
different host which is out of the scope of this research. 
However, the spoofing takes place in another scenarios such 
as DDoS attack. 
 
 
VII. MONITORING NORMAL AND ABNORMAL DNS 
TRAFFIC BEHAVIORS 
 
The ratio of abnormal traffic in the C&C server appeared 
to be higher compared to the normal DNS traffic in the case 
of Botnet [6]. This abnormal DNS traffic appears only in a 
short and discrete time, but the activity of a legitimate host 
appears for a longer and maybe continuous time as shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Normal and Abnormal DNS Traffic 
The “botmaster” instructs all the Bots to perform their 
malicious activities simultaneously as groups in a short and 
discrete time and then stop all these activities suddenly, and 
so on. Taking this important behavior into consideration, the 
detection of Botnet can be made possible. 
 
 
This method relies on monitoring the DNS traffic for 
certain time ; this time is divided into different time 
intervals t  and t .  A relationship is formed between any 
two blocks of hosts requesting the same domain name and 
calculates the probability of botnet detection between these 
two blocks of hosts by using Jaccard similarity as portrayed 
in Figure 2. The probability of botnet detection is 
possible if the size of block X and Y is not equal to zero and 
if the DNS ratio R  within the monitoring time is also 
greater then zero as depicted in Equation 2: 
 
 
              
                                                  (2) 
     R  in T 0 
  
 
 
Figure 2.  Applying Jaccard Similarity between Two Blocks of Hosts 
 
A simple mechanism framework is created to classify the 
DNS traffic and detect the Botnet activity in DNS; it is called 
the Botnet Detection Mechanism (BDM). The BDM consists 
of three main phases: capturing phase, analyzing phase, and 
classifying phase as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  BDM Framework 
The BDM counts the query data at each time intervals for 
any domain name requested by blocks of hosts during the 
monitoring time . If there are two groups/bocks of hosts 
requesting the same domain name at time interval t  and 
t , then the BDM applies the Jaccard similarity S  between 
these groups of hosts and uses the MAC addresses as the 
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host’s identifier. The BDM performs this by measuring the 
ratio of overlapping MAC addresses in the two groups. 
Hence, the BDM stores the results in the database as normal 
domain name issued by legitimate hosts or abnormal domain 
name issued by botnet activity as per the similarity 
probabilities detailed in Table 2. If an abnormal domain 
name is found, the BDM sends alarm to the network 
administrator to block this abnormal domain name. The 
MAC addresses of these infect hosts are marked as blacklist.  
 
Since bots queries the DNS server as a group of hosts 
periodically, If there is any domain name requested by a 
single host at different time intervals then it could be a 
normal domain. Therefore, the probability is calculated for 
this single host (could be an infected host used by the 
botmaster to check his domain validity in C&C server). This 
host activity usually occurs before the block of infected hosts 
queries the domain name that has been checked by the 
“botmaster”. The BDM performs checking at every single 
host on whether it is a bot infected host or legitimate host. 
This can be done by matching the domain name requested by 
this single host with the normal and abnormal domain name 
stored in BDM database and requested by groups of hosts.  
 
If a single host that had requested a normal domain name 
which is stored in the database then, it cannot be clearly 
stated that this is a normal domain name because the infected 
host also requests for normal domain name due to the user’s 
activity. Thus, in this case the MAC matching is performed 
to obtain better identification results. If there is no matching 
between the domain names requested by the single host and 
the domain names stored in the database, then the BDM 
considers this as a new domain name which is not stored in 
its database. In this case, the BDM performs MAC matching 
between the MAC address of this host and the blacklisted 
MAC addresses stored in the database and checks if this host 
sends repeated query to this domain name as depicted in 
Figure 4. However, if there is no matching, then the BDM 
considers it as a normal domain name, and stores it in its 
database. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Matching Single Host with Database 
 
If there is a matching (the host activity sends repeated 
queries), then the BDM sends alarm to the network 
administrator to block this new abnormal domain name, 
because this behavior caused by the bots in the single hosts 
(i.e. early infection stages). However, this new domain name 
is stored in database as abnormal domain name, because it is 
a new domain name that the botmaster will use to 
communicate with his bots and issue further commands in 
the future.  This allows BDM to predict the new attackers’ 
domain name and send alarm to the network administrator to 
block it before the group of infected hosts appear and acquire 
it, which prevents the botnet activity on the network.  
 
 
VIII. VALIDATION 
 
Test is performed on BDM at NAv61 Network in USM to 
capture the real DNS requests from the hosts. The iNetmon2 
project was utilized in this test. The BDM runs on Intel core2 
Duo 2.00 GHz CPU and 2.00 GB memory with Microsoft 
Windows Vista operating system. The simulator BotDNS is 
installed and runs in different hosts of the NAv6 network and 
set up requests a specific domain name (i.e. www.xxx.com) 
periodically, which is every 60 seconds.  
 
The action taken in this scenario is to store this domain 
name as an abnormal domain name and send alarm to the 
network administrator to block it before the infected hosts 
request for this new domain name and consequently prevent 
the network from botnet activity in the future. 
 
 
A. Performance Test Results 
 
The experiment was carried to capture the real DNS 
request from the hosts in NAv6 network. The obtained 
results of classifying domain names are stored in the BDM 
database. These results contain more than 2000 domain 
names, which are requested by the hosts during the 
experiment.   
 
The classification of domain names into normal domain 
names caused by the legitimate hosts and abnormal domain 
names caused by Botnet activity is shown in Figure 6. The 
threshold value for the Botnet domain name is set within 0.8 
to 1 and for legitimate domain name, it is set within 0 to less 
than 0.8, based on the Jaccard similarity value as mentioned 
earlier in Table 2.    
 
                                                           
1  National Advanced IPv6 Centre of Excellence, www.nav6.org 
2  iNetMon: Network Monitoring Platform, www.inetmon.com 
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Figure 5.  Domain Names Classification Based on Jaccard Similarity 
 
 
B. False Positive    
 
A false positive classifies a normal domain name as 
abnormal domain name. The false positive rate  can be 
calculated with Equation 3 [8]: 
 
                =                                      (3) 
 
Where, refers to the number of false positive domain 
names detected and  refers to the total number of true 
positive,  domain name detected and the number of false 
positive,  domain names detected. 
 
We repeated the above test three times*; hence, it is 
observed that in the first experiment there is no false positive 
generated, whereas most legitimate domain names are 
classified correctly as normal domain names, so the false 
positive rate is 0% for this experiment.  In the second 
experiment, there is a normal domain that is classified as 
                                                           
* These tests were repeated three times for average reading. While the 
detection experiment was performed over one week. 
abnormal domains, so the false positive is present in this 
experiment, where the BDM classifies Google as abnormal 
domain name. During the second experiment period, there 
are three abnormal domain names detected and one 
legitimate domain name classified as abnormal domain 
name. The rate of false positive generated during this 
experiment is 33%. 
 
 =  ≈ 33% 
 
 
Finally the third experiment is same as the first 
experiment where no false positive is generated, so the false 
positive rate is 0% in this experiment. By taking the average 
value for the false positive rate from these three experiments, 
the rate of false positive generated during the experiments is 
11%. 
  
Average =  ≈ 11% 
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From the ratio of false positive rate, the detection rate of 
BDM can be obtained. The detection rate,  can be 
calculated with Equation 4 [8]: 
 
                               =                                        (4) 
 
From the first and third experiments, there is no false 
positive found, hence the detection rate is approximately 
100%. However, in the second experiment the detection rate, 
is approximately 67%:  
 
=  ≈ 67% 
 
By taking the average of detection rate, it can be 
observed that BDM has average detection rate of 89% during 
these three experiments that are considered acceptable. 
 
Average = ≈ 89% 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, a simple framework is proposed called the 
BDM for botnet detection in a network environment. The 
framework consists of three phases that capture the DNS 
traffic, extract the MAC address, and query name from this 
DNS packet and store it in the database for further analysis. 
After that, the BDM classifies the DNS traffic that is issued 
by blocks of hosts (group behavior) and single host 
(individual behavior). 
 
The proposed method depends on monitoring the DNS 
traffic and exploiting the behavior of Botnet. The Botnet is 
detected in blocks of hosts (group behavior) by measuring 
the degree of similarities between any two blocks of hosts 
requesting the same domain name at different time intervals 
based on the Jaccard similarity coefficient S . The MAC 
address is used as host’s identifier instead of IP address.  
 
The results of the experiments on the NAv6 network 
shows that the BDM is robust and works well, with the 
average detection rate of about 89%. It is capable of 
classifying the domain names into normal and abnormal 
domain names, consequently, detecting the Botnet activity 
within the network.  The  BDM  classifies  domain  names based on the Jaccard similarity value. However, during the 
experiments, in average the BDM generated false positive 
and false negative rate, which was approximately 11% in 
each case.  
 
The main limitation in the testing is that the average 
detection rate is based on three experiments only. A future 
work could be to do more experiments for better accuracy. 
Another future work is considering the improvement of the 
BDM to enable identifying and tracing back the infected 
hosts within the monitored network as well as enhancing and 
increasing the detection rate by minimizing the false 
positive/negative alerts by incorporating different statistical 
methods such as chai-square along with the jaccard 
similarities coefficient.   
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